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MIRANDA AND THE I.R.S.
MIRANDA AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
While serving a sentence in the Florida State Penitenti-
ary, the petitioner was the subject of a civil tax investiga-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service. Subsequently, he was
convicted in a United States court, under 18 U.S.C. § 287,'
for knowingly filing false federal income tax refund claims
against the government. Part of the evidence on which the
conviction rested consisted of oral statements and documents
given voluntarily by petitioner to the Internal Revenue agent
who conducted the civil investigation.2 This evidence was
obtained without warning petitioner of his fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination 3
In Mathis v. United States,4 the Supreme Court rejected
the contention that tax investigations are immune from the
fourfold warnings required by the ruling in Miranda v. Ari-
zona5 to be given in custody. In arriving at this decision, the
Court noted that petitioner's confinement, i.e., on an unre-
lated charge, at the time of this investigation necessitated
the aforementioned warnings at a time commensurate with
the investigation by the Internal Revenue agent.
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1964), which provides: 'Whoever
makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, mili-
tary, or naval services of the United States, or to any de-
partment or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the
United States, or any department or agency therof, know-
ing such claims to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
2 See United States v. Fiore, 258 F.Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966),
which held that requirements for warnings of constitutional
rights of defendants in custody are not applicable to in-
ternal revenue investigations and that voluntariness re-
mains the test of admissibility of evidence procured.
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
5 384 U.S. 456 (1966). In Miranda the Court said: "He must
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
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Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Mathis, the rules
for the conduct of interrogation set out in Escobedo v. Illinoiso
and Miranda had been thought not to apply to interrogation
of a taxpayer by Internal Revenue personnel. These decisions,
unlike Mathis, dealt exclusively with incustody interroga-
tion, rather, than with taxpayers who voluntarily came to
the interview and were not in custody.7
Subsequent to Mathis, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, refused to require that the Miranda warnings be given
in a precustody Internal Revenue Service inquiry.8 Similar-
ly, the Second Circuit held that the referral of a case to a
special agent does not change the focus of the case enough
to require the Miranda warnings.9 On the other hand, at least
two district courts do require Miranda warnings when a spe-
cial agent enters the investigation.10
It is suggested that both of the above positions fail to
satisfy the Miranda requirements. The Miranda warnings are
premised on the element of custody, and are set forth in
clear and unequivocal language.
"(W)e hold that when an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities in any significant way and is subjected
to remainsilent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of any attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires." Id. at 479.
0 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7 See United States v. Spinney, 385 F.2d 908 (1st Cir. 1967);
Bohrod v. United States, 248 F.Supp. 559 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
8 United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1968); Froh-
man v. United States, 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1967).
) United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1968).
10 United States v. Wainwright, 248 F.Supp. 129 (D. Colo.
1968); United States v. Turzyuski, 268 F.Supp. 847 (N.D.
Ill. 1967).
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to questioning, the privilege against self-incrirnina-
tion is jeopardized."
If the principles of Miranda are to be extended to criminal
tax fraud cases, the obstacle of custodial interrogation and
the requirement that the investigation be focused oi a par-
ticular individual must be overcome.
In the usual tax investigation, the taxpayer is not re-
duced to physical confinement. Nevertheless, there exists the
significant factor of confrontation between an individual and
a representative of the Government.' 3 This confrontation can
be very perplexing, subjecting the taxpayer to direct coer-
sion. The danger of undue physical and psychological pres-
sure demands that the rights of the individual be secured
in compliance with Miranda.4
A lower New York state court in People v. Allen, 5 held
that the terms "focus" and "accusatory" stages are no longer
relevant; but the new standard is "compulsion".16 "Compul-
sion," as defined by the New York Court, "is simply question-
ing in any setting where a criminal fact may be elicited."'17
Therefore, the use of psychological coercion or compulsion
at any stage of the investigation commands the warnings of
Miranda to be given. If the spirit of Miranda is to be up-
held, such actions must be deemed a part of "custodial inter-
rogation".
11 384 U.S. at 478.
12 Comment, Constitutional Rights of a Taxpayer in a Criminal
Tax Investigation, 16 J. PuB. L. 403 (1967).
3IBAR & REM, CRIMINAL INEROGATION AM CONESSION
(1962). Contains a specific study of recommended tech-
niques of investigation.
14 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
'r Id. at 903, 272 N.Y.S. 2d at 255.
16 Id.
17 Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a
Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES 660, 683 (1966).
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The Supreme Court by defining "custodial interrogation"
as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way,", must have
visualized future battlegrounds: the police car, the streets,
public places, and even the home.20
Thus, did the Supreme Court in Mathis limit the circum-
stances under which the Miranda warnings must be given to
the particular fact situation and the custodial surrounding
in which the questioning was conducted; or did the Court
extend the warnings to any citizen whether interviewed at
home, work, or in a governmental office by a Revenue agent?21
The majority in Mathis felt that: "tax investigations
frequently lead to criminal prosecution.12 2 This language in-
dicates that any in custody questioning, in the sense the
phrase was used in Miranda, must be preceded by the four-
fold warnings if it is within the broad area of investigation
which frequently leads to criminal prosecution.
In conclusion, the principles set forth in Mathis could
be made applicable to any governmental employee conduct-
ing a civil investigation: if the investigation is within the
broad area which frequently leads to criminal prosecution.
As stated by Justice Frankfurter, "Under our system society
carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused
not out of his own mouth."23
Is 384 U.S. at 444.
19 Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Com-
ments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Vol-
untariness" Test, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 59 (1966).
20 See generally, Justice White's dissenting opinion in Mathis
v United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
21 391 U.S. at 4.
22 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
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